Hispania after the Second Punic War

The Iberian Peninsula was one of the main theatres where the fight between Rome and Carthage known as the Second Punic War (218BC-201BC) developed. This area was the main source of richness and manpower for the armies of the Barcid family, as the composition of Hannibal's army in Italy proves, with thousands of Celtiberian (coming from the centre of the Peninsula) and Iberian warriors (from the coast along the Mediterranean Sea) fighting inside its ranks.
Although this zone was Roman territory after the Carthaginian defeat, seems more theoretic than real. The conquered zone, divided in two different provinces in 197 BC (Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior), rebelled against Roman power when the different administrators raised high taxes.

"Cneius Cornelius Blasio, who had administered Hispania Citerior before Tuditanus, was authorised by the senate to enter the City in ovation. Before him were borne 1515 pounds of gold and 20,000 of silver, and also 34,500 silver denarii. L. Stertinius, who made no effort to obtain a triumph, brought away from Hispania Ulterior 50,000 pounds of silver for the public treasury, and with the proceeds from the sale of the spoil he erected two gateways in the Forum Boarium in front of the temples of Fortuna and Mater Matuta, and one in the Circus Maximus."

Livy, 33.27

The uprising began at the farther province from Rome, Hispania Ulterior, but extended to the Citerior on a fast way. Both praetors, Sempronium Tuditanum and Marcus Helvius, were defeated with heavy losses (dying the former in combat) although each one had at his disposal 8000 Latin infantrymen and 400 horsemen. Next year the situation was not better, as the praetors Quintus Fabius Buteo and Quintus Minucius Thermus couldn't stop the rebellion.

The threat of losing both provinces grew until centring the attention of the Roman Republic, so the senate began to plan its reaction for the upcoming year.

Roman response to the Hispanic rebellion

The elected consuls for 195BC were Marcus Porcius Cato and Lucius Valerius Flaccus, being Cato appointed to Hispania. The force given to him to accomplish his mission was a complete consular army, composed of 2 Roman legions, 15000 Latin allies and additionally 800 horsemen.

Cato was young to be consul (he had 39 years, when the stipulated age was of 42), and its family was not between the richest of Rome. Its popularity was given by the support of the agricultural class at which he belonged, and his personal abilities. He was an excellent writer and orator, defender of the traditional virtues of Rome; he criticized the Hellenisation of Roman society that replaced frugality for luxury, and his austerity often produced clashes between him and the wealthier families of Rome, headed by the Scipios.

Cato managed to suit the army for the campaign on an short time. With his consular army and the troops of Publius Manlus, praetor of Hispania Citerior (2000 infantrymen and 200 cavalrymen), he requised an important number of vessels to transport its soldiers to the theatre of war. The fleet sailed from the port of Luna towards Hispania. After passing along the coast near the Pyrenees, he attacked an small Iberian garrison in the Greek city of Rhoda. Finally, he ordered the fleet to sail to Emporion, one of the most important cities of Hispania Citerior where the Iberian army had concentrated its forces.

Emporion and the battlefield

Emporion was the main gate to the Roman dominions inside the Iberian Peninsula. As the land connections were slow, insecure and easily blocked at the narrow passes of the Pyrenees, the route towards Hispania had to pass through this port in order to follow the coastline to Tarraco. The Iberian leaders knew that, if they managed to close this door, they would have chances to defeat the Roman power in Hispania.

Emporion was founded as a commercial Greek colony in sixth century BC. This city was chosen, during the Second Punic War, by Publius and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio (father and uncle of Scipio Africanus) to disembark a Roman attacking force in Hispania (218 BC) in order to harass Hannibal's rearguard while he was campaigning in Italy. This Republican army constructed a camp near the Greek city, leaving it after the end of the war. As this fortification was on a strong defensive position, it seems probable that the Iberian army established there its encampment.

The geography of the zone has changed substantially in 2000 years, as the course of the Ter river has been modified, but different studies has contributed to the reconstruction of the battlefield. Emporion, the Greek city, was founded as a commercial settlement (in fact Emporion had two constructions; the small Palaiapolis and the big city, the Neapolis). Its defensive situation was weak, rounded by sea and the hill where the Roman encampment was constructed afterwards. This was the reason why the greeks, probably in the second century BC, designed such an important defensive system as we can still see today.

The limited siege resources of the Iberian army made difficult to conquer the Greek city; moreover the Roman supremacy at sea made impossible to cut the supplies to the city, but a defensive belt was constructed around it, making profit of the old Roman camp.
We can imagine the thoughts of Cato when he landed on the Greek city, known as Neapolis with part of his army: Emporion was surrounded, with a line of palisades in the elevations surrounding the city, without knowing what force had the enemy after this position.

The Romans take the initiative

Cato was a fairly ambitious man, and the Roman political structure of yearly consulships made him take the initiative to defeat the Iberian army as fast as he could. Most of the rebels were concentrated in Emporion, so he didn't want to lose the chance to defeat them on a single stroke.

Cato began the construction of a Roman camp for his legions near the city, the sea (this was his line of supply and communication with Rome) and the enemy. He also established a second encampment, 3000 meters away from the city, outside the Iberian siege belt.

He encouraged the Roman soldiers to set up skirmishes with the Iberian warriors, in order to know which were the capabilities of his own army, and the fighting value of the enemy. In contradiction of the popular idea of the Republican Roman legions as a heavy and slow force, Cato undermined the morale of the Iberians destroying the harvests around the zone and harassing its rearguard with nightly sorties of his soldiers, forcing the enemy to stay inside its fortifications and improving the confidence of his own army.

"He sent his men into the enemy's fields in quest of plunder, first in one quarter and then in another as occasion served, leaving only a small guard in the camp. They generally started at night in order to cover as great a distance from the camp as possible and also to take the enemy by surprise. This kind of thing was a training for the new levies and led to the capture of numerous prisoners, till the enemy no longer ventured outside the defences of their forts."

Livy. 34.13

He also wanted to give his soldiers experience in combat, improving at the same time the confidence of his army with speeches and rewards. When he noticed the poor morale of the enemy through the information provided by the prisoners, Cato decided to commit his forces in a decisive battle in order to destroy the entire Iberian army. In case of victory he would be able to plan a pacification campaign for the rest of Hispania, with the essential port of Emporion controlled.

The decisive day

We don't know how much time Cato spent on these skirmishes, but is probable that the battle was fought at the end of the summer of 195 BC. At midnight of the chosen day, after attending the auspices, Cato ordered his troops to take positions at the other side of the enemy fortifications, concealing his forces under an elevation (nowadays known as the hill of “Les Corts”).

At dawn the Roman commander ordered an small detachment of his troops to attack the palisades of the enemy. The Iberians saw, at the first light of the day, maybe one thousand warriors attacking his encampment without support, and decided to face this weak force. In the meantime Cato made an speech to his legionaries, trying to prepare them for the upcoming combat. After some skirmishes Cato ordered the vanguard to fall back slowly. The enemies, thinking that the Romans were retreating, went out of the fortifications in full force, in order to start a pursuit. They had fallen in Cato's trap. It is probable that the Iberian chiefs didn't want to lose the glory of an easy victory, so no reserve was organized. Moreover the Iberian advance would have disordered the battle line.

First movements

1.- First Roman attack, at dawn.

2.- Iberian response.

3.- Main clash

4.- Roman flank attack

Cato ordered a full attack of his concealed cavalry and infantry against the disordered enemies, sending at the same time two cohorts to organize a flank attack against the enemy's right. The second legion was left in reserve, following the Roman tradition of having always an important part of the forces apart from combat, at the disposal of the commander.

The Romans had to face different threats, as the number of Iberian warriors and their quality was important. The major menace came from the Roman right flank, where the cavalry was decisively defeated and routed. Cato himself had to move to this point if the line, in order to raise the morale of his soldiers and stop them fleeing from the battlefield.

"As long as the action was confined to the discharge of missiles it was equally contested on both sides, but now the Roman right, where the panic and flight began, was with difficulty holding its ground; the left, on the other hand, was pressing back the barbarians in front, and the cohorts in the rear were creating panic amongst them. When they had discharged their iron javelins and fired their darts they drew their swords and the fighting became more furious. They were no longer wounded by chance hits from a distance, but foot to foot with the foe they had only their strength and courage to trust to."

Livy, 34.14

Cato moved the second line of his forces (the Principes) to the front, bringing fresh forces.

We can imagine the effect of this vision in the Iberian warriors; fatigued from the fight against velites and hastati, another pila volley smashed them, killing and wounding high numbers of warriors. At this moment the Principes charged using their gladius, concentrating their forces against a section of the line and breaking the enemy centre. The Iberians decided they had enough fight for this day, and began to retire to his near encampment.

Main clash

5.- Principes counterattack
6- Iberian retreat
7.- Roman second legion attacks left gate
8.- Iberians massacred.

The battle was almost won, but Cato knew that, if the Iberians managed to retire to their camp without too much losses, it would be quite difficult to destroy them without spending the whole year. He no longer needed the second legion as an emergency force, so he decided to use these soldiers against a weak spot detected on the Iberian defences: the leftmost door of the camp. This gate was hold by an small detachment of Iberians, so the Princeps and Hastati of this second legion managed to assault, conquer and pass through it in a few minutes, entering the fortification and attacking the enemy from the rear. It was a desperate situation for the Iberians, that were defending the palisades from the attacks of the first legion. Caught beneath both forces, they were massacred (Livy tells us that the Romans killed 40.000 Iberians just in this battle).

Aftermath: Cato crushes Iberia

Cato left his troops pillage the Iberian site as well as the country near the Roman camp. Iberian towns and cities surrendered Cato as he moved his army through the coast towards Tarraco. It is probable that most of the Iberian chiefs were killed or captured in this battle so, without their warriors, the Iberians had only a choice: submission or destruction. Cato realised that, if he wanted to finally crush the rebellion, he had to disarm Hispania Citerior. He had nor troops neither time to accomplish this hard work, so he finally decided to send a letter to every Iberian city with this message: they had to destroy their walls on a single day; on the contrary they would be annihilated. As every site thought that the menace was directed just to itself the trick was accomplished, and all the walls were destroyed in the same day, leaving at Roman mercy the destiny of the Iberian people. Most of the archaeological works on Iberian towns show this destruction of the walls; the sites that didn't accomplish the order were completely massacred by the Roman army.

Finally, Cato returned to Rome, at the end of his consulship, bringing with him an impressive booty; for his victories over both Hispanic provinces he was awarded with a triumph.

The Roman legions, hardened through the encounters of the Second Punic War, had developed into an extremely versatile and disciplined force and, commanded by a superior commander like Marcus Porcius Cato, had shown the world that no enemy could match them.

Further reading:

A. Goldsworthy, The complete roman army, Thames & Hudson, 2003.

W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70BC, Oxford University Press, 1985.

F.X. Hernàndez, Història militar de Catalunya (4 volumes), Barcelona, Rafael Dalmau Editors, 2004. (in catalan)

L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire, USA, University of Oklahoma Press, 1998.

J.E. Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts. A history of battle in classical antiquity, USA, Yale University Press, 2005.

J. Martínez Gázquez, La campaña de Catón en Hispania, Spain, Ariel, 1974. (in spanish).

published as "Cato's triumph: the battle of Emporion" inside the journal "Ancient Warfare", vol.I, issue 4, 2008 (c) Karwansaray BV